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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in identifying the separate property 
portion of Husband's retirement plans? "A trial court has considerable discretion con-
cerning property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption 
of validity. We disturb a trial court's property division and valuation 'only when there is 
a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error, the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity 
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 
83 Tj 17, 45 P.3d 176 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to Wife 
and in the amount of that award? "An award of attorneys fees in divorce actions rests 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, which we will not disturb absent an abuse of 
discretion." Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct. App.1994). 
ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to treat Husband's interest in the Utah 
Power & Light Company Deferred Compensation Plan as his sole and separate property 
even though the plan's benefit level was frozen prior to the marriage? The abuse of dis-
cretion standard described in Elman v. Elman, supra, applies to this issue. This issue was 
preserved at R. 373, pp. 756-57 and elsewhere. 
2. Did the trial court err in treating Husband's continuation of retirement in-
come from his basic retirement plan while the divorce was pending as an inappropriate 
use of marital assets and charging those withdrawals to his separate property portion of 
the account? The abuse of discretion standard described in Elman v. Elman, supra, ap-
plies to this issue. This issue was preserved at R. 373, p. 757 and elsewhere. 
3. Did the trial court err in making additional "equitable adjustments" which 
were intended to and had the effect of diminishing the value of Husband's separate prop-
erty interests? The abuse of discretion standard described in Elman v. Elman, supra, ap-
plies to this issue. The equitable adjustments were not advocated by either party and thus 
no specific objection to them is recorded in the record; however, Husband objected to any 
transfers of separate property to the marital estate absent a finding of exceptional circum-
stances at R. 373, pp. 750-51. 
4. Did the trial court err in treating Husband's Lenox collection as a marital 
asset? The abuse of discretion standard described in Elman v. Elman, supra, applies to 
this issue. This issue was preserved at R. 373, pp. 724-27, Exhibit P-49, and elsewhere. 
5. Did the trial court err in its alimony award, and particularly in including in 
Husband's income the retirement withdrawals which it earlier treated as Husband's sepa-
rate property rather than income? A trial court's determination of alimony is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). This 
issue was preserved at Exhibit D-17 and in off the record meetings with the trial court 
referenced at R. 373, p. 731. 
6. Respondent also contests the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees 
to Wife, which is an issue raised by both parties to this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce entered by the Second Judicial 
District Court of Davis County, Utah. (R. 328-31.) The parties have no minor children, 
so the issues were limited to property division, alimony, and attorney's fees. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Petition for Divorce was filed December 30, 2002. (R. 1-4). The court en-
tered temporary orders by stipulation on February 4, 2003.] The case was tried to the 
court on May 26, June 26, July 22, August 25, and October 1, 2004. (R. 228-29, 231-32, 
235-36, 258-61.) The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 310-
27) and Decree of Divorce (R. 328-31) on March 2, 2005. Wife filed her Notice of Ap-
peal April 1, 2005. (R. 348-49.) Husband filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on April 11, 
2005. (R. 363-65.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ron and Brenda Oliekan (pronounced "o'-ta-kin") were married on February 13, 
1993 and separated September 1, 2002. They have no minor children. Both parties had 
been married before. Husband brought significant assets, including a home and a Lenox 
collection, into the marriage, and both parties have premarital interests in retirement 
benefits. 
The temporary order is not in the record on appeal and could not be located in the 
court's file during trial. A copy of the temporary order, however, was attached to Wife's 
brief at Addendum F. 
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At the time of trial, Wife was age 54. Wife had been employed by the State of 
Utah as an office manager and supervisor in the department of Adult Probation and Pa-
role for the past 11 years. She is in good health although she has been treated with medi-
cation for depression. (R. 311.) Her earnings were $3,896.71. (R. 324 J 60.) Wife's 
employment was a continuation of the employment she had held prior to the marriage. 
Husband was age 57 at the time of trial. He was retired from Utah Power & Light 
Company and PacifiCorp, where he worked as a construction supervisor in line work and 
substation construction. He began working for Utah Power & Light Company on April 7, 
1969 and accepted an early retirement package from its successor company, PacifiCorp, 
on March 1, 2001. He presently does consulting work on PacifiCorp jobs. He is in good 
health, but has had back problems and takes medication for control of diabetes. (R. 311-
312 If 6.) Husband's income as a consultant was $5,204.39. (R. 324161.) 
A. The Parties' Retirement Plan Interests. 
Wife was a participant in the Utah State Retirement System. She joined the plan 
April 19, 1982 and accrued 3,953 days of service in the plan prior to the date of the mar-
riage, and she remained employed by the State of Utah as of the date of entry of the De-
cree of Divorce in this case. As of November 1, 2004, Wife had accrued 4,279 days of 
service during the marriage. Husband was awarded a fraction of any benefit due under 
the plan, the numerator of which is 4,279; and the denominator of which is 8,252, pursu-
ant to the formula set forth in Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). 
(R. 312 If 10.) 
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During his employment, Husband accrued retirement benefits in three separate ac-
counts: 
(1) Basic Retirement Plan 
(2) Deferred Compensation Plan 
(3) 401(k)Plan 
The Basic Retirement and Deferred Compensation plans were defined benefit re-
tirement plans. (R. 370, p. 164.) Accordingly, they did not accrue account balances dur-
ing the marriage. Instead, Husband earned a monthly retirement benefit which would be 
calculated based upon his final average compensation and years of service in those plans. 
When he accepted early retirement in March of 2001, he elected to convert his accrued 
benefits in those plans to lump sum cash payments, which he rolled over into Individual 
Retirement Accounts at World Financial Group. The lump sums were equal to the pre-
sent value of the annuities the plans would otherwise have provided. (R. 369, p. 68.) 
The 401(k) plan was a defined contribution plan. (R. 370, p. 164.) In other words, 
that plan carried an account balance that increased based on contributions from salary, 
employer matching contributions, and earnings on investments. When Husband retired in 
2001, he rolled the account balance in the 401(k) over into an IRA at Fidelity Invest-
ments. (R. 3l31f 12.) 
The trial court's approach to allocation of Husband's retirement benefits between 
premarital and marital portions was simple. The court determined that the separate por-
tion of the two defined benefit plans could be calculated as of the date of the lump sum 
distribution using the Woodward formula. For the Deferred Compensation and Basic Re-
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tirement plans, the court determined how many days of service were reflected in the final 
balances distributed from the plans on March 1, 2001. From April 7, 1969 through 
March 1, 2001, 11,651 days of service accrued. Of those days, 8,714, or 74.79 percent, 
occurred prior to the marriage date of February 13, 1993. Accordingly, applying the 
Woodward formula, 74.79 percent of the benefit in these plans that was distributed on 
March 1, 2001 accrued prior to marriage and was Husband's separate property. 
The trial court further found that once the two portions were separately identified, 
earnings attributable to those portions took on the same characterization as the principal. 
Thus, the court determined that the ratio established on March 1, 2001 continues to apply 
to the funds in those accounts. 
The 401(k) computation was done differently to reflect the accrual of an account 
balance in the plan over time. At the time of the marriage, the balance in the 401(k) plan 
was $29,915.85. The court calculated the rate of return earned by the plan each year dur-
ing the marriage, and applied that rate of return to the premarital balance on an annual 
basis to arrive at its final determination of the premarital portion of the 401(k) plan. 
(R. 314 % 16.) 
The trial court's calculations, as well as its treatment of Husband's early retire-
ment incentives, are discussed below. 
1. PacifiCorp Basic Retirement Plan. 
The PacifiCorp Basic Retirement Plan was a defined benefit plan. From his origi-
nal hire date of April 7, 1969 through his retirement on March 1, 2001, Husband accrued 
11,651 days of service. Of those days, 8,714, or 74.79 percent, accrued prior to the mar-
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riage. (R.319, f^ 35.) At the time of his retirement, Husband received the funds in this 
account in a lump sum distribution of $250,251.23. Those funds were rolled over into 
World Financial Group account no. ******3916. (R. 313-14 ^ 14; R. 319 fl 34, 35.) 
The trial court found that Husband's Basic Retirement Plan was a defined benefit 
plan and thus had no ascertainable account balance at any time prior to its conversion to a 
lump sum on March 1, 2001. R. 319 % 34.) The terms and conditions of the Basic Plan 
are described in Exhibit D-13. The court rejected Wife's contention that the separate por-
tion of the Basic Plan could be calculated based upon the amount that would have been 
distributed under the plan's benefit formula if Husband had been permitted to retire on 
February 13, 1993 because he was not eligible for retirement on that date and thus could 
not have received that amount, and because adopting that calculation would result in 
years of service for benefit accrual not being treated equally. (R. 320 ^ f 38.) 
After accounting for withdrawals (discussed below), the trial court divided the Ba-
sic Retirement Plan as follows (R. 321 |^ 39): 
Basic Retirement 
Withdrawals during Separation 
Total 
June 16 2004 
Value 
$175,255.17 
$ 
_$175355. .17 
Add with-
drawals Dur-
ing Separation 
$ 79,800.00 
$ 
$ 79.80000 
Add interest 
on withdraw-
als 
$ 5,464.00 
$ 
,$,,_51464_.QQ 
Cash value 
prior to with-
drawals 
$ 260,519.17 
$ 
$ 260.519.17 
Marital Portion 
(25.21%) 
$ 65,672.03 
$ (46,200.00) 
$ 19 47203 
Pre Marital Por-
tion (74.79%) ! 
$ 194,847.14 
$ (33,600.00) 
$ 161.247 14 
2. Utah Power & Light Company Deferred Compensa-
tion Plan. 
Husband was a participant in the Utah Power & Light Company Deferred Com-
pensation Plan prior to and during the marriage. This plan was a defined benefit plan. At 
the time of his retirement, Husband received the funds in this account in a lump sum dis-
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tribution of $146,430.58. Those funds were rolled over into World Financial Group ac-
count no. ******3915. (R. 313 H 13.) 
The court found that the Deferred Compensation Plan ("DCP") was a defined 
benefit plan and thus had no ascertainable account balance at any time prior to its conver-
sion to a lump sum on March 1, 2001. (R. 317 ^ 26.) The terms and conditions of the 
DCP are described in Restated Appendix D of Exhibit D-13. The trial court divided the 
funds in the DCP using the same Woodward ratio it used to divide the Basic Retirement 
Plan (R. 317 If 27), and rejected Wife's contention that a 1993 benefit value could be as-
certained for the same reasons it rejected that argument under the Basic Retirement Plan. 
(R. 318 H 30.) 
The DCP, however, was different from the Basic Retirement Plan because benefit 
levels under the DCP were frozen in 1990. The purpose of that action was "to freeze the 
benefit levels accrued at that time based on earnings levels then in effect." (Ex. D-13, 
p. 47.) Eligibility to participate in the DCP was determined based upon employment 
status on October 11, 1989, and the plan provided fixed benefit levels based on a partici-
pant's earnings as of January 1, 1990. (Id., p. 47 ^ 1.1, p. 48 % 3.1.) Husband's benefit 
level was frozen at $1,820 per month for 180 months based on his earnings of between 
$40,000 and $50,000 as of that time. (R. 370, p. 181.) Following 1990, the DCP pro-
vided that a participant's level of benefits depended on the participant's age upon retire-
ment. A participant who retired at age 65 received 100 percent of the 1990 benefit level 
specified in the plan. The percentage dropped to 93 percent if retirement occurred at age 
64, and continued on a sliding scale to 51 percent if retirement occurred at age 55. (Id., 
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p. 49.) Wife erroneously describes this provision of the DCP as accrual of "years of ser-
vice." In fact, years of service were irrelevant to the calculation. The calculation was 
based strictly upon age at retirement, not years of service, and is more appropriately char-
acterized as an interest rate calculation. Husband earned no benefit in the DCP after 
1989. (R. 369, pp. 65-66.) The payment Husband received in 2001 was the monetary 
equivalent of the benefit that existed in 1990. (R. 370, p. 176.) In other words, the 
change in value of the benefit from 1990 to 2001 was due to passive appreciation. (See 
id., pp. 176-77.) In Husband's case, a discount rate of 5.25% was used to calculate the 
present lump sum value of his DCP benefit as of his date of actual retirement in 2001. 
(R. 370, p. 185.) Husband had met all qualifications for his benefits under the DCP prior 
to the date of marriage in this case. (R. 370, pp. 183-85.) 
Because benefit levels were frozen in 1990 and years of service did not accrue af-
ter that date, Husband contended that the DCP was entirely a premarital asset. The court 
acknowledged that the plan's benefit level was frozen under the DCP prior to the mar-
riage, but nevertheless included a portion of the DCP in the marital estate because "the 
parties' work together during the years of the marriage allowed Mr. Oliekan to retire, and 
[Husband] was required to be an employee on the date of retirement in order to qualify 
for the benefit." The court characterized its decision as an "equitable adjustment for the 
time of [Wife's] contribution to the marriage." (R. 318 If 31.) 
After accounting for withdrawals (discussed below), the trial court divided the 
DCP as follows (R. 319 If 32): 
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Deferred Comp Plan 
Withdrawals during Separation 
Total 
June 16 2004 
Value 
$125,234.70 
$ 
$125.234.70 
Add withdraw-
als during 
separation 
$ 25,200.00 
$ 
$ 2520000 
Add interest 
on withdraw-
als 
$ 3,272.91 
$ 
$ 3.272.91 
Cash value 
prior to with-
drawals 
$ 153,707.61 
$ 
$ 153 707 61 
Marital Portion 
(25.21%) 
$ 38,746.83 
$ (700.00) 
S 3804683 
Pre Marital Por-
tion (74.79%) 
$ 114,960.79 
$ (24,500.00) 
$ 90,460.79 
3. PacifiCorp 401 (k) Plan. 
Husband was a participant in the PacifiCorp 401(k) plan prior to and during the 
marriage. This plan was a defined contribution plan. At the time of his retirement, Hus-
band received the funds in this account in a lump sum distribution of $186,676.67. Those 
funds were rolled over into Smedley Financial Services account no. *******0400. 
(R. 313 112.) 
On the date of marriage, Husband's 401(k) plan had an account balance of 
$29,915.85. That balance included a loan of $8,664.73 against the account which was 
deducted from that beginning balance, resulting in an adjusted beginning balance of 
$21,251.12. The trial court applied the actual rate of return earned in the plan to deter-
mine the appreciation on that adjusted beginning balance from the date of the marriage 
through the date of the distribution on March 1, 2001. The calculation of rates of return 
was shown on Exhibit D-3A, page "Exhibit 4." Using that methodology, the court found 
that the premarital portion of the final account balance on March 1, 2001 was $43,349.76, 
calculated as follows: 
Year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Days 
321 
365 
365 
365 
Beginning 
Balance 
$21,251.12 
$21,188.21 
$21,770.87 
$26,304.87 
Return 
-0.34% 
2.75% 
20.83% 
8.32% 
Ending 
Balance 
$ 21,188.21 
$ 21,770.87 
$ 26,304.87 
$ 28,493.30 
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1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
365 
365 
365 
365 
90 
$28,493.30 
$30,915.30 
$34,589.52 
$37,145.72 
$43,464.64 
8.50% 
11.88% 
7.39% 
17.01% 
-1.07% 
$ 30,915.30 
$ 34,589.52 
$ 37,145.72 
$ 43,464.64 
$ 43,349.76 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded that, as of March 1, 2001, $43,349.76, 
or 23.22 percent, of the total amount of $186,676.67 in this account on March 1, 2001 
was Husband's premarital property. (R. 314-15 ^ 16.) 
The rate of return was calculated from statements that disclosed beginning and 
ending balances for each relevant year. Roger Smith, Husband's financial expert, ascer-
tained the total growth of the account in each calendar year, then adjusted that total 
growth to account for loans and contributions during the year. Those calculations permit-
ted Mr. Smith to isolate the rate of growth in investment value, or what Wife in her brief 
refers to as "passive" appreciation. (R. 369, p. 71; R. 370, pp. 122-23, 134.) There is no 
merit to Wife's contention that the rate of return calculated by Mr. Smith and relied upon 
by the trial court, included more than passive growth in investment value during the mar-
riage.2 
4. Early Retirement Incentives. 
Husband's employer, PacifiCorp, decided to reduce its workforce in 2001. As part 
of its Workforce Transition Retirement Program, PacifiCorp offered Husband the oppor-
2
 Mr. Smith's exhibit (D-3A) described these figures as "estimates" because the parties 
did not have copies of every monthly statement during the marriage. (R. 369, p. 70.) Mr. 
Smith did, however, have year-end statements for every year, and testified that he as-
sumed contributions and earnings occurred evenly through the year. (R. 370, pp. 131-32, 
135-38.) 
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tunity to retire early under the terms of that program with enhanced benefits, as identified 
in Exhibits D-7, D-14, and D-15. 
As part of his early retirement, Husband was provided with certain incentives ap-
plicable to the defined benefit plans. (R. 318 % 29.) Those incentives included the calcu-
lation of benefits using two additional years of service and two additional years of age 
under the plan formula (R. 370, pp. 187-88), and the provision of a Social Security 
"bridge" benefit of $44,208.45. (R. 370, pp. 201-02.) The bridge benefit was the present 
value of monthly payments of $500 to age 65. It was paid to compensate for the fact that 
the employee will not be able to collect social security benefits until age 65. (R. 370, 
p. 202.) The bridge benefit was included in the lump sum payment from the Basic Re-
tirement Plan. (R. 370, p. 203.) As a final incentive, the interest rate used to calculate 
the lump sum equivalent of the various plan payments was reduced from 5.83% to 
5.25%, which had the effect of increasing the lump sum. (R. 370, pp. 183, 188.)3 The 
trial court found that, although the foregoing incentives were made available to Husband 
during the marriage, they were the result of all of his years of service under the plan, not 
simply his years of service during the marriage (R. 318 ^  20) and the record supports that 
finding. (R. 370, pp. 275-76.) Eligibility for early retirement was based on completion 
of 15 years of service, which Husband had in 1984, and attainment of age 53. (R. 370, 
pp. 190-91.) Accordingly, the trial court concluded based on the evidence that the early 
retirement incentives should be divided utilizing the same formula as was used to divide 
3
 The rather daunting arithmetic used in calculating the enhanced benefits is explained at 
R. 370, pp. 190-200. 
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the portion of the distribution that was not the result of early retirement incentives. 
(R. 3181129.) 
5. Withdrawals from Retirement Accounts. 
During the pendency of this action, Husband withdrew certain sums from the par-
ties' IRA accounts. The court found that some of those withdrawals violated the Tempo-
rary Order, and that Wife's interest in the marital estate should be made whole by treating 
the withdrawals as having been withdrawn from Husband's separate property. (R. 315 
118.) 
At the time of his retirement in March 2001, Husband commenced monthly with-
drawals of $2,100 from the Basic Retirement Plan. From March of 2001 and continuing 
through the trial, Husband withdrew $2,100 per month from the Basic Plan. (R. 319-20 
136.) In February of 2003, an order was entered in this case providing in paragraph 8, 
"Each party is restrained and enjoined from selling, gifting, transferring, alienating, 
pledging, or otherwise disposing of the parties' marital assets." That provision was part 
of a temporary order which also provided for payment of $800 per month to Wife as tem-
porary alimony and required Husband to make payments on all marital debt except the 
second mortgage.4 In support of the motion for temporary alimony, Wife asserted that 
the $2,100 per month withdrawals were part of Husband's income and thus part of his 
ability to pay temporary alimony. (R. 10.) At trial, however, Wife reversed course, as-
4
 See Appendix F to Wife's brief. 
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serting that Husband's continued withdrawals of $2,100 per month following entry of the 
Temporary Order violated paragraph 8 of the order. 
Despite the lack of a clear prohibition in the Temporary Order of continuation of 
the withdrawals, the trial court concluded, "Both as an equitable adjustment... and also 
because of paragraph 8 of the Temporary Order, the monthly withdrawals from March 
2003 through June of 2004 from the Basic Plan, in the total amount of $33,600, are 
treated as marital property rather than income and are deemed to have been taken from 
respondent's share of marital property. The balance of the withdrawals, $48,300, oc-
curred during the marriage and prior to separation and is deemed to have come from 
marital funds and not in violation of the Temporary Order." (R. 320 ^ f 36.) 
Husband made three additional post-separation withdrawals. The first, for 
$25,200 from the DCP, occurred January 15, 2003, before entry of the temporary order. 
It was used to pay various joint and personal expenses. (Ex. D-3A, p. "Exhibit 7.") The 
trial court found that all but $700 of this withdrawal should be charged to Husband's 
separate funds (R. 317-18 ^  28), even though it was undisputed that $2,163 of those funds 
were used to pay the parties' joint 2002 taxes and $1,100 were used to pay car insurance 
on the parties' vehicles. (Ex. D-3A, p. "Exhibit 7.") 
The other two withdrawals were taken from the 401(k) funds. It was undisputed 
that $4,780 of that money was used to pay joint taxes, and thus reduced a marital debt 
(Ex. D-3A, p. "Exhibit 7"), but the court nevertheless charged the withdrawals entirely to 
Husband. (R. 316 fl 20-21.) 
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B. The Trial Court's'EquitableAdjustments" 
When it made its ruling, the trial court announced several "equitable adjustments" 
to the property division, each of which had the effect of reducing Husband's share in 
marital property. The court justified the "equitable adjustments" as follows: "The Court 
also recognizes that a large amount of the retirement benefits accrued during the marriage 
during respondent's last years of service and intends to make some equitable adjustments 
to recognize that." (R. 314 H 15.) 
The "equitable adjustments" consisted of the following: 
• "The Court's decision to include the entire DCP as a marital asset is an eq-
uitable adjustment for the time of petitioner's contribution to the marriage 
" (R. 318 If 31.) The effect of this "equitable adjustment was to in-
clude $38,746.83 of Husband's separate property in the marital estate. (See 
R. 319 If 32.) 
• "Both as an equitable adjustment (see paragraph 15), and also because of 
paragraph 8 of the Temporary Order, the monthly withdrawals from March 
2003 through June of 2004 from the Basic Plan, in the total amount of 
$33,600, are treated as marital property rather than income and are deemed 
to have been taken from respondent's share of marital property." (R. 320 
137.) 
• "Respondent should be awarded the 1998 GMC truck at a net value of zero. 
Although the debt exceeds the value of the truck by approximately $2,500, 
the Court has determined that the value should be set at zero as an equitable 
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adjustment (see paragraph 15) and taking into consideration that respondent 
had the use of the truck since it was purchased." (R. 323 *| 50.) 
• "Respondent should be awarded the Dutchmen Lite 26FK trailer at a net 
value of zero. Although the debt exceeds the value of the trailer by ap-
proximately $2,100, the Court has determined that the value should be set 
at zero as an equitable adjustment (see paragraph 15) and taking into con-
sideration that respondent had the use of the trailer since it was purchased." 
(R. 323 H 51.) 
The cumulative effect of the foregoing "equitable adjustments" was to reduce 
Husband's separate property by $38,746.83 and Husband's share of the marital estate by 
$38,200.00. The trial court made no findings of exceptional circumstances which would 
justify these adjustments. 
C. Facts Regarding the Lenox Collection. 
Prior to and during the marriage, Husband had accumulated a collection of Lenox 
porcelain figurines. At trial, he specifically identified those pieces which had been ac-
quired prior to marriage, those which had been acquired later, and those which had been 
inherited. (Ex. P-49.) Husband challenges the trial court's factual finding that the Lenox 
collection should be included in the marital estate and therefore marshals the evidence on 
this point as follows: 
Husband testified that he began collecting Lenox in 1971 or 1972. (R. 371, 
p. 448.) In addition to his own collection, he began gifting Lenox figurines to his mother 
long before the marriage. (Id.) Husband specifically identified in his testimony the 
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pieces that had been purchased by the parties for themselves during the marriage (R. 372, 
pp. 724-27) and which pieces he had purchased either for his mother or for himself prior 
to the marriage (Ex. P-49). Wife admitted that the Lenox bird collection had been gifted 
to Husband's mother, and then inherited by Husband upon his mother's death in Decem-
ber 2002. (R. 371, pp. 389, 412; R. 372, p. 625.) These are the only evidentiary refer-
ences to the Lenox collection in the record. 
Despite that clear evidence regarding the separate nature of most of the Lenox col-
lection, the trial court included all of the Lenox collection in the marital estate. This had 
the effect of overstating the value of the marital estate by $3,120.35. (See ex. P-49.) 
D. The Trial Court fs Alimony Calculation. 
The trial court found that Husband had an ability to pay alimony of $450 per 
month, and ordered him to pay $500 per month to Wife for a period of 118 months. It 
based the $50 discrepancy on a finding that Husband had commenced a relationship with 
another woman before his final separation from Wife. (R. 325 fflj 63-64.) 
In determining Husband's ability to pay, however, the trial court included in Hus-
band's income the $2,100 per month withdrawals from the Basic Retirement Plan that it 
had earlier characterized as distributions of property. (R. 324-25 ^ 61.) Thus, in effect, 
the court ordered husband to pay $59,000 ($500 X 118 months) of his property to Wife in 
monthly installments. The trial court's treatment of those withdrawals as property for 
purposes of its "equitable adjustment" and finding that the Temporary Order had been 
violated, and as income for purposes of the alimony calculation, was inconsistent. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's treatment of the proceeds of the defined benefit plans was funda-
mentally sound. Although they had been converted to present value and cashed out, the 
difficulties inherent in valuing defined benefit interests still persisted with regard to 
valuation of the interests on the date of marriage. The trial court's approach gave equal 
weight to each year of service and thus did not commit the infraction identified in and 
remedied by Woodward. The trial court's rejection of the figures contained in Exhibit P-
4 was based on evidence demonstrating that the figures were unreliable, and was accord-
ingly entitled to deference. 
Similarly, the trial court properly rejected Wife's commingling argument. That 
argument is also a factual argument, and Wife's position ignores Mr. Smith's testimony 
that although the funds were deposited together, the marital and separate portions could 
still be identified. The trial court's findings on this issue were also entitled to deference. 
The trial court also properly ascertained the marital portion of the 401(k) plan. Its 
approach was to identify the balance as of the date of marriage, and to credit that balance 
with the investment income it earned during the marriage. Contrary to Wife's claims, the 
trial court's factual findings were supported by evidence that passive appreciation had 
been isolated from contributions. Once again, the trial court's findings are sound and en-
titled to deference. 
The trial court's treatment of the DCP plan, however, was erroneous. The evi-
dence was clear and undisputed that benefits under the DCP were frozen in 1990 and that 
the only thing Husband received from that plan was the benefit he had earned as of 1990, 
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adjusted by an interest rate calculation. The trial court's findings seem to acknowledge 
this fact, describing the reason for including the DCP in the marital estate as an "equita-
ble adjustment." Nevertheless, to the extent it was not an "equitable adjustment," it was 
contrary to the clear and uncontroverted evidence. 
The trial court also erred in punishing Husband with over $70,000 in "equitable 
adjustments" designed to compensate Wife for the alleged fact that the defined benefit 
plans grew more rapidly as Husband approached retirement. The court's justification 
contravenes Woodward, which requires that years of service be treated equally. It also 
suggests a reliance on the discredited 1993 benefit statements. Regardless, the "equitable 
adjustments" are not supported by "commendably detailed findings" demonstrating an 
extraordinary or exceptional circumstance which demands a remedy. The "equitable ad-
justments" should be reversed. 
The trial court also erred in including the entire Lenox collection in the marital es-
tate. The evidence was uncontroverted that $3,120.35 in value of the collection was ei-
ther acquired prior to marriage or was inherited from Husband's mother. 
The trial court's treatment of Husband's monthly $2,100 withdrawals from the Ba-
sic Retirement Plan was also erroneous. The court implicitly found that Husband was in 
contempt of the Temporary Order by continuing these withdrawals, even though the 
Temporary Order was premised on including the $2,100 per month in Husband's income. 
The evidence was not clear and convincing that Husband knew the order would be inter-
preted to require that those withdrawals terminate following entry of the Temporary Or-
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der. This decision was also improper as an "equitable adjustment," for the reasons dis-
cussed above. 
The alimony order demonstrates the defects in the treatment of the $2,100 per 
month withdrawals as dissipation of marital property. In awarding alimony, the trial 
court adopted the inconsistent position that the $2,100 monthly withdrawals were not 
property, but income available for payment of alimony. Without that money, Husband 
plainly had no ability to pay alimony based upon the trial court's findings. The trial 
court's alimony award, when considered in conjunction with the finding that the with-
drawals were dissipation of property in violation of the Temporary Order, effectively re-
quires the transfer in installments of an additional $59,000 of Husband's property to 
Wife. The result imposed by the trial court on this issue was not only inconsistent, but 
inequitable and contrary to law. 
Finally, the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Wife, while entitled to defer-
ence, was an abuse of discretion in this instance. It did not appropriately take into ac-
count the financial burdens placed on Husband by the court's order. It was erroneously 
based on a belief that Wife needed to preserve her retirement assets, but failed to ac-
knowledge that Husband had the same need and that, with no other identified source for 
payment, the award required Husband to invade his own remaining retirement assets in 
order to make the ordered payment. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. HUSBAND'S PREMARITAL PROPERTY MUST BE EX-
CLUDED FROM THE MARITAL ESTATE IN THIS CASE. 
Utah law is well-settled that in a divorce, premarital property must be returned to 
the spouse who owned it before the marriage. There are exceptions to the general rule, 
but none is applicable here: 
The general rule is that equity requires that each party retain the 
separate property he or she brought into the marriage, including any appre-
ciation of the separate property. Exceptions to this general rule include 
whether the property has been commingled, whether the other spouse has 
by his or her efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the separate prop-
erty, and whether the distribution achieves a fair, just, and equitable result. 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citation omitted). Accord, 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
According to Burt, the appropriate procedure is for the trial court to first return 
premarital property to the spouse who brought it into the marriage. 799 P.2d at 1172 
("the court should first properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital es-
tate or as the separate property of one or the other"). "Generally, trial courts are also re-
quired to award premarital property, and appreciation on that property, to the spouse who 
brought the property into the marriage." Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 ^ 18, 45 P.3d 
176. The court is then to divide the remaining marital estate equitably. There is a strong 
presumption that the marital estate should be divided in half absent exceptional circum-
stances. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1172 ("[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or 
her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property"). 
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In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court 
explained that property acquired by one spouse either by gift or inheritance becomes a 
part of the marital estate if "(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense con-
tributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquir-
ing an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost 
through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an 
interest therein to the other spouse." 760 P.2d at 308. 
II. THE COURT'S TREATMENT OF HUSBAND'S BASIC RE-
TIREMENT PLAN AND HIS 401(K) PLAN WAS CORRECT, 
BUT ITS TREATMENT OF THE DEFERRED COMPENSATION 
PLAN WAS NOT. 
A. The Court Properly Ascertained the Marital Portion of the 
Basic Retirement Plan. 
There are several methods for dividing retirement benefits. The appropriateness of 
a given method depends upon the nature of the retirement assets in issue. A defined 
benefit retirement plan is a plan that does not carry an account balance. The amount of 
benefit to be received depends upon the number of years of service the participant com-
pletes, and may be tied to other factors as well. 
In a defined benefit plan, the benefit which is promised is calculated by a 
formula defined in the pension plan provisions. The employer pays a speci-
fied benefit at retirement. In some defined benefit plans, the employee con-
tributes nothing; in others, the benefits are based, in part, on what the em-
ployee contributes. The employer's contribution to the plan, however, var-
ies from year to year based on the amount which is needed at any particular 
time to pay the benefits which are due. Individual accounts of each em-
ployee's contribution, if any, are maintained, but these accounts do not 
specify an employer contribution. 
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In a defined contribution plan, however, individual accounts specify 
not only the employee's contribution, but the employer's as well. The 
benefits to be paid in the defined contribution plan, however, unlike those 
in the defined benefit plan, are not fixed, for they depend upon the perform-
ance of investments which are made with the contributions. 
Berrington v. Berrington, 534 Pa. 393, 633 A.2d 589, 590 n.l (1993). 
Thus, at the time of the divorce, a defined benefit retirement plan may not have a 
value that can be determined without resort to speculation. In this case, the trial court 
properly found that the Basic Retirement Plan and DCP were defined benefit plans. 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), describes the proper way to 
ascertain the marital and separate portions of a defined benefit plan. In that case, hus-
band had been an employee of Hill Air Force Base for 15 years. He had to complete 30 
years of service to receive maximum retirement benefits, and the amount of those future 
benefits would not be fixed until his retirement. Accordingly, the trial court could not ar-
rive at a fixed dollar amount for division in the case without speculating and thus inap-
propriately placing the risk of future uncertainty on one spouse or the other. Because of 
the difficulty in placing a present value on the future benefits to be derived from such a 
"defined benefit" plan, the Supreme Court approved a method of dividing the retirement 
asset based on the ratio of years of service during the marriage to total years of service at 
the time benefits commence. The Court indicated that this fixed percentage method of 
distribution applied "'where no present value can be established.'" 656 P.2d at 433 
(quoting Kikkert v. KikkerU 177 N.J. Super. 471, 427 A.2d 76, 79-80 (1981)). 
In this case, the Woodward formula was properly applied to determine the pre-
marital portion of the March 1, 2001 distributions. The plans were defined benefit plans 
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which did not accrue account balances. The value of the benefit could not be established 
until Husband retired. Thus, there was no other way to ascertain a present value of the 
plans as of the date of the marriage. 
Wife offers three criticisms of the trial court's application of Woodward in this 
case. First, she contends that it was improper to apply the Woodward formula to interests 
which eventually were converted to lump sums. Second, she contends that a document 
admitted into evidence as Exhibit P-4 established a value of the Basic Retirement Plan 
and DCP interests as of the date of the marriage. Third, she contends that by leaving the 
funds in a single account after March 1, 2001, Husband "commingled" the funds so that 
his separate property lost its separate character. 
1. The Trial Court's Approach to Identification of Sepa-
rate and Marital Property, and Its Rejection of the Ex-
hibit P-4 Analysis, Was Correct. 
Wife claims that, because PacifiCorp told Husband that the plan formula would 
have given him $46,148.94 from the Basic Retirement Plan and $67,994.24 from the 
DCP if he had been able to retire in 1993, those figures establish the premarital portion of 
his benefits. Wife's approach violates the Woodward rule and is inconsistent with the 
Woodward rationale. 
The trial court's determination of the amount of money to be excluded from the 
marital estate as Husband's separate property, including its rejection of the Exhibit P-4 
analysis, was a factual determination which is entitled to deference. Wife's contention 
that a meaningful value could be assigned to defined benefit plan interests in 1993, while 
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Husband was still working, is fundamentally flawed and contrary to law. The trial court 
properly rejected it. 
Wife's analysis is flawed because Husband was not able to receive the amounts 
stated in Exhibit P-4 in 1993 or at any other time. Exhibit P-4 was a mathematical calcu-
lation based strictly on the benefit formula set forth in the plan, but without any consid-
eration of Husband's eligibility for retirement in 1993. The trial court specifically found 
that Husband "was not eligible for retirement [in 1993] and thus could not have received 
that amount...." (R. 318 ^  30; R. 320138.) 
More importantly, Wife's proposal is directly contrary to Woodward. Indeed, it is 
the approach rejected in Woodward. Consider the result if this divorce had been occur-
ring in 1993, and Husband contended that the plan benefit formulas should be applied as 
though he was going to retire in 1993. That is precisely what the court rejected in Wood-
ward because the benefit would inevitably have been undervalued at that time. In that 
case, in order to receive maximum benefits from the plan, Mr. Woodward had to partici-
pate for 30 years. At the conclusion of 30 years, the government would match his contri-
butions to the plan. Mr. Woodward argued that the court should apply the benefit for-
mula as of the date of divorce, after 15 years of service, and that the government match-
ing contribution should not be counted because it would occur after the marriage. The 
court rejected that argument because "his pension benefits, including any contribution by 
the government, are as dependent on the first fifteen years as the last fifteen." 656 P.2d at 
433. The only fair way to divide the benefit was on the basis of years of service, because 
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that was the only way to give equal weight to each year of service upon which the full re-
tirement benefit was based. 
The flaw in Wife's analysis in this case is that she does not give equal weight to 
each year of service. If Wife's analysis were correct, it would be just as correct to ask 
PacifiCorp to tell us what benefit would accrue to a person hired February 14, 1993 and 
retiring in 2001. Plainly, the total of those figures, the benefit supposedly earned up to 
February 14, 1993, and the benefit supposedly earned after that date, would not add up to 
the total benefit Husband earned. This is because the retirement formula heavily weights 
the fact that the participant has completed a full 30 years of service and attained retire-
ment age, The 24 years of service before the marriage are just as important as the 8 years 
after marriage in computing the final benefit, and it is impossible to do an interim calcu-
lation that incorporates the full final benefit. Mr. Smith testified: 
[Y]ou need all the years of service from the start date through the retire-
ment date to get the number that you get on the lump sum. Without that 
you couldn't get it—you can't bifurcate that, if you will, because you need 
both the premarital and marital portion to get that total. If you were just to 
look at the marital term of say eight years or so, that would be a very small 
amount in the actual calculation. So you need both the premarital years, 23 
years of serve, plus the eight years or so of marital service. You add that up 
and that's how you'd get your total at the end. You need both. (R. 370, 
p. 209.) 
You should treat them all [years of service] equally. You need to 
have kind of like a train, you need to have the engine and the caboose and 
that's the calculation using them both. (R. 370, p. 276.) 
Exhibit P-4 did not reflect such an analysis, and thus did not provide a reliable or 
accurate measure of the value of Husband's benefits as of February 13, 1993. The trial 
court was well within its discretion in rejecting it. 
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2. The Woodward Analysis Was Correct Even Though 
the Benefits Had Been Reduced to Present Value and 
Distributed In a Lump Sum. 
Wife next argues that, at the time of trial, all of Husband's retirement monies re-
sided in IRA defined contribution plans. Because Woodward does not apply to defined 
contribution plans, and because Husband was no longer an employee of PacifiCorp, Wife 
argues that use of the Woodward formula was automatically improper. 
The fact that Mr. Oliekan is no longer employed by PacifiCorp does not change 
the applicability of the Woodward formula. In Stephens v. Stephens, 728 P.2d 991 (Utah 
1986), a challenge to application of the Woodward formula in a setting where the em-
ployed spouse was no longer employed by the company providing the benefit was re-
jected as "frivolous." 729 P.2d at 992. 
Although the retirement benefits now reside in defined contribution plans, it was 
undisputed that the lump sum distributions simply represented the present value of the 
equivalent defined benefit. The alternative Wife offers is exactly the methodology the 
court rejected in Woodward because of its tendency to undervalue retirement benefits 
which are payable at some time in the future, based on factors which are unknown at the 
time of valuation. The relevant issue is not what is the status of the plans today, but what 
was their status in 1993, the date of Wife's attempted valuation. Woodward provides the 
proper framework for answering that question. The trial court properly rejected Wife's 
proposal as both factually and legally incorrect. 
The Woodward formula applies here because each year of service in the plan 
counts the same in computing the final benefit. It is not possible to determine what por-
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tion of Husband's benefit is attributed to the first 24 years of employment and what por-
tion is attributable to the last 8. Wife's analysis suggests that the first 24 years were 
worth only $4,756 per year, while the last 8 were worth $32,582.86 per year. It means 
that even though 75 percent of Husband's work to earn his final retirement benefit oc-
curred prior to the marriage, 70 percent of the benefit he earned would be included in the 
marital estate. Plainly, the plan did not work that way. Wife's proposed analysis is not 
consistent with common sense, equitable principles, or Utah law. Woodward requires 
that in this setting the division be based on years of service performed to earn the benefit. 
The trial court understood this: 
The Court in the following treatment of respondent's retirement 
plans has attempted to identify the marital portion earned during the eight 
years the of marriage prior to March 1, 2001, by giving equal credit for 
each year of respondent's service in the plans. The Court believes that its 
decision to give equal credit for each year of respondent's service in the 
plans is consistent with the approach set forth in Woodward v. Woodward, 
656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), although the Court also recognizes that the 
formulas that it is applying are not strictly Woodward formulas because the 
benefits were converted to lump sums before the end of the marriage. The 
Court also recognizes that a large amount of the retirement benefits accrued 
during the marriage during respondent's last years of service and intends to 
make some equitable adjustments to recognize that. (R. 314 Tf 15.) 
The authorities relied upon by Wife (Appellant's brief, pp. 35-36) do not support 
her position, and in fact are contrary to it. None of them supports Wife's theory that, 
when the lump sum distribution occurred, the defined benefit plan formula became inap-
plicable both as to past and future benefits. In Mann v. Mann, 22 Va. App. 459, 470 
S.E.2d 605 (1996), the court was dealing with a defined contribution plan, not a defined 
benefit plan. The court adopted a method of division of the account consistent with the 
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trial court's treatment of Husband's 401(k) plan in the instant case. 470 S.E.2d at 607-
08. In Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000), the court was reviewing divi-
sion of a defined contribution plan, not a defined benefit plan. 22 S.W.3d at 149. Simi-
larly, the retirement plan at issue in In re Marriage of Hester, 122 Or. App. 147, 856 P.2d 
1048 (1991) was a defined contribution plan. 856 P.2d at 1049. In Tanghe v. Tanghe, 
115 P.3d 567 (Alaska 2005), the court disapproved use of a coverture fraction in division 
of a 401 (k) defined contribution plan. 115 P.3d at 570-71. Paulone v. Paulone, 437 Pa. 
Super. 130, 649 A.2d 691 (1994), also involved a defined benefit plan. 649 A.2d at 694. 
None of those cases presented the situation the case at bar presents, where defined benefit 
plan benefits had been earned both before and during the marriage, and then converted to 
present value and deposited in an account as lump sums. 
3. Wife's Commingling Argument Is Without Merit Be-
cause Evidence Supported the Trial Court's Finding 
that Separate Property Remained Identifiable. 
Wife's argument that the separate funds lost their separate character by being left 
in the accounts with marital funds was rejected by the trial court and is easily disposed of. 
In essence, Wife is arguing that the defined benefit plan payments can no longer be sepa-
rately identified once they are rolled over into an account that carries a cash balance. 
Wife's argument is a challenge to the trial court's factual finding that the funds were 
separately identifiable. Wife has not marshaled the applicable evidence. Mr. Smith testi-
fied that although marital and separate funds were deposited together, they could still be 
traced and separately identified. (R. 370, p. 228.) The mere act of converting Husband's 
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benefits to a lump sum did not change the fact that a large majority of those benefits were 
his separate property, and could be identified as such using the Woodward formula. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Ascertained the Marital Portion of 
the 401(h) Plan. 
In contrast to the Basic Retirement Plan and DCP, the 401(k) plan is a defined 
contribution plan. That means that it had an account value at the date of the marriage. In 
that situation, Utah law calls for a different analysis, which requires the court to "award 
premarital property, and appreciation on that property, to the spouse who brought the 
property into the marriage." Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83 K 18, 45 P.3d 176 (em-
phasis added). 
The issue of accrued interest on the premarital portion of the retire-
ment account should be analyzed pursuant to the general rules regarding 
premarital property and separate property. The general rule is that equity 
requires that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into 
the marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property 
We agree with the lower court that Dr. Dunn is entitled to his pre-
marital contributions to the retirement account. Because the record does 
not indicate that Mrs. Dunn, through her efforts, augmented, maintained, or 
protected the separate property, other than her maintenance of the house-
hold accounts, we agree with the lower court that Dr. Dunn is also entitled 
to all interest attributable to those contributions. 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In the present case, Husband presented just such an analysis of his 401(k) account. 
Starting with the date-of-marriage balance of $21,251.12, Mr. Smith determined the an-
nual rate of return or loss on the 401(k) plan from the date of the marriage through the 
present. He applied that rate of return to the $21,251.12, which had grown to $64,318.85. 
The remaining funds in the account, which consisted of contributions during the marriage 
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and earnings on those contributions, were segregated out to be included in the marital es-
tate in this case. 
Wife attacks the trial court's acceptance of Mr. Smith's method of calculating the 
rate of return the 401(k) plan earned during the marriage. The court's determination of 
the appropriate rate of return to be applied to Husband's premarital balance was a factual 
finding which is entitled to deference on appeal. Wife's brief fails to marshal the evi-
dence on this point, which clearly supports the trial court's findings. 
Without any factual basis, Wife contends that the analysis failed to isolate earn-
ings from contributions. To the contrary, Mr. Smith explained in great detail how he had 
isolated passive earnings from contributions. Those calculations permitted Mr. Smith to 
isolate the rate of grown or investment value, or what Wife in her brief refers to as "pas-
sive" appreciation. (R. 369, p. 71; R. 370, pp. 122-23, 134.) 
So what you did is you had actual data for contributions, company matches 
and loans and the only other thing that could cause a change from the be-
ginning to ending balance is earnings. So you took out those three compo-
nents, the contributions, the match and the loans and you're left with what 
the earnings is. 
A. Correct. (R. 370, p. 134.) 
There is no merit to Wife's contention that the rate of return calculated by Mr. 
Smith, and adopted by the trial court, included more than passive growth in investment 
value during the marriage. 
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C. The Trial Court Erred In Including a Portion of the DCP In 
the Marital Estate. 
While the trial court's application of Woodward to the DCP was correct if it was 
marital property, Husband asserts as part of his cross-appeal that the trial court erred in 
including the DCP in the marital estate. The trial court's handling of the DCP is in some 
respects unclear in that it appears the court may have accepted the proposition that the 
DCP was separate property yet included it in the marital estate as one of its "equitable ad-
justments:" 
The Court rejects respondent's contention that the DCP is entirely a 
premarital asset. The Court believes that there needs to be some recogni-
tion that, even though the plan's benefit level was frozen under the DCP 
prior to the marriage, the parties work together during the years of the mar-
riage allowed Mr. Oliekan to retire, and respondent was required to be an 
employee on the date of retirement in order to qualify for the benefit. The 
Court's decision to include the entire DCP as a marital asset is an equitable 
adjustment for the time of petitioner's contribution to the marriage (see 
paragraph 15). (R. 318^31.) 
To the extent the trial court's justification is limited to the "equitable adjustment" 
theory, it is discussed below under Point III as a violation of the "exceptional circum-
stances" requirement of Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). 
To the extent the decision was a rejection of Husband's separate property claim 
for a reason other than as an "equitable adjustment," the decision was erroneous. The 
facts were clear that benefits under the DCP were frozen in 1990 and that the only thing 
Husband received from the DCP was the benefit he had earned as of 1990, adjusted by an 
interest rate calculation. The DCP thus was a classic situation for application of the rule 
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that "trial courts are . . . required to award premarital property, and appreciation on that 
property, to the spouse who brought the property into the marriage." Elman, 2002 UT 
App 83 Tf 18. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S "EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENTS" WERE 
INAPPROPRIATE. 
The trial court's "equitable adjustments" were not based on a finding of extraordi-
nary circumstances, and therefore under Utah law were an abuse of the court's discretion 
to fashion an equitable property division. Separate property that has not been commin-
gled or augmented by marital effort can only be included in the marital estate under ex-
traordinary circumstances. Although separate property is not "totally beyond [a] court's 
reach in an equitable property division," Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), the court may award the separate property of one spouse to the other spouse 
only in "'extraordinary situations where equity so demands.'" Id. (quoting Mortensen, 
760 P.2d at 308). In general, in order to include separate property in the marital estate, or 
to divide marital property unequally, the court must support its decision with "com-
mendably detailed findings" memorializing the exceptional circumstances supporting the 
decision. Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373 ^27, 993 P.2d 887; Thomas v. Tho-
mas, 1999 UT App 239123,987 P.2d 603. 
The trial court in this case made no finding of exceptional circumstances. Rather, 
it concluded that the presumed growth in premarital retirement assets during the marriage 
entitled Wife to a portion of those assets. As discussed above, that alleged growth is illu-
sory and based on the flawed proposition, rejected elsewhere by the trial court, that Ex-
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hibit P-4 established a meaningful premarital value for the defined benefit plans. Having 
accepted the premise that the increase in separate property during the marriage was pas-
sive, the trial court necessarily violated the Elman standard by attempting to gerrymander 
the property division to give Wife a share of that passive increase. Because the trial 
court's justification for the "equitable adjustments" is infirm, those adjustments were an 
abuse of the court's discretion and must be reversed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN INCLUD-
ING THE ENTIRE LENOX COLLECTION IN THE MARITAL 
ESTATE. 
For the reasons discussed in the Statement of Facts, the trial court erred in includ-
ing the entire Lenox collection in the marital estate. The evidence that $3,120.35 in value 
of the Lenox collection was either acquired prior to marriage or was inherited from Hus-
band's mother was uncontroverted. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in 
including the entire Lenox collection in the marital estate. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO TREAT HUSBAND'S 
$2,100 PER MONTH RETIREMENT WITHDRAWALS AS 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTIONS CHARGEABLE TO HIS SHARE 
OF THE MARITAL ESTATE WAS ERRONEOUS. 
Following entry of the Temporary Order in this case, Husband continued his pre-
separation practice of withdrawing $2,100 per month from the Basic Retirement Plan. 
Between entry of the order and conclusion of trial, $33,600 had been withdrawn. The 
court found these withdrawals to violate the Temporary Order's prohibition against alien-
ating marital property. 
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The trial court's decision to charge the $33,600 in withdrawals to husband's share 
of the marital estate was necessarily based on an implicit finding of contempt. In civil 
contempt proceeding, the complainant has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a valid court order existed, that the defendant had knowledge of the order, 
and that the defendant disobeyed the order. Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Hawaii, Inc. v. Bad 
Ass Coffee Ltd Partnership, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1255 n.7 (D. Utah 2000) {citing Cheff 
v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966)). 
In the instant case, those requirements were not met. Although the court's order 
prohibited dissipation of marital assets, it was entered in the context of an order requiring 
payment of temporary alimony, which in turn was based upon an affidavit of Wife that 
treated the $2,100 per month retirement withdrawals as income, not property. The order 
did not specifically prohibit continuation of the $2,100 per month withdrawals, which had 
been instituted immediately upon Husband's retirement in March, 2001, nearly two years 
before the order was entered. Wife's own affidavit established that Husband did not have 
the ability to comply with the financial obligations imposed by the Temporary Order 
without continuation of the monthly withdrawals. Husband reasonably believed that the 
order did not reach his continuing monthly retirement income. Under the circumstances, 
the evidence does not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Husband 
knowingly disobeyed the court's order by not suspending his retirement withdrawals 
when the Temporary Order was entered. 
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VI. THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD WAS ERRONEOUS 
WHEN CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITS RULING 
ON WITHDRAWALS IN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE 
TEMPORARY ORDER. 
"
w[T]he most important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent 
the wife from becoming a public charge.'" English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 
1979 (quoting Nace v. Nace, 107 Ariz. 411, 489 P.2d 48, 50 (1971)). With this purpose 
in mind, the Court in English articulated three factors that must be considered in fixing a 
reasonable alimony award: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the wife; (2) the 
ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself; and (3) the ability of the 
husband to provide support. Id. at 411-12. 
In this case, the trial court's alimony award is erroneous in two respects. First, the 
trial court treated alimony as though it wa*<an entitlement of Wife. In so doing, it failed 
to take into account the admitted fact that Wife's financial circumstances were essentially 
unchanged after the marriage from what they had been before the marriage. Wife was 
working at the same job, with the same benefits (including retirement benefits) as she had 
prior to marriage. Husband was required to pay all marital debt, which left Wife essen-
tially debt-free following the divorce. The only material negative change was that the 
$7,000 in equity she had in her home prior to marriage (R. 370, p. 282) was consumed by 
the parties during the marriage. (R. 312 f^ 9.) In circumstances where the spouse claim-
ing alimony has not suffered a material financial setback as a result of the marriage, and 
the standard of living during the marriage was roughly what it had been before the mar-
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riage, the function of alimony is not implicated and alimony should not be awarded. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) (requiring consideration of "financial condition" of re-
cipient spouse). 
More importantly, however, the trial court erred in its inconsistent treatment of 
Husband's $2,100 per month withdrawals from the Basic Retirement Plan. In justifying a 
$33,600 reduction in Husband's share of the marital estate, the trial court treated with-
drawals as property, even though Wife had characterized the withdrawals as income in 
her moving papers. In other words, the court in interpreting the Temporary Order at trial 
decided that the withdrawals were not income to Husband. The trial court did not treat 
Wife's income while the case was pending in the same manner. To the extent Wife spent 
her income, funds that otherwise would have been included in the marital estate escaped 
such treatment. Even though Husband's monthly retirement withdrawals were used in 
exactly the same manner as Wife's income, for living expenses and to maintain debt pay-
ments, the trial court treated his withdrawals as property rather than income, reducing 
only Husband's portion of the marital estate. 
When the trial court turned to the consideration of alimony, however, it changed 
its treatment of Husband's retirement withdrawals, characterizing them as income rather 
than property as using them as the justification for requiring Husband to pay $500 per 
month for 118 months, a total of $59,000, to Wife. While retirement income can cer-
tainly be taken into consideration in setting alimony, the trial court in this case erred in its 
inconsistent treatment of the withdrawals as property for one purpose and income for an-
other. Husband believes that the withdrawals are more appropriately treated as income 
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rather than property, but either the alimony award must be reversed or the decision to 
treat the $33,600 in withdrawals as an advance on Husband's share of marital property 
must be reversed. The result imposed by the trial court was not only inconsistent, but in-
equitable and contrary to law. 
VII. THE TRIAL ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
WIFE. 
In divorce cases, an award of attorney's fees "must be based on evidence of the fi-
nancial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the rea-
sonableness of the requested fees." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
"The award of attorney fees is a highly fact-dependent process. Indeed, in determining 
reasonable attorney fees, this court has set out factors that should be considered. These 
factors include, but are not limited to, 'the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the 
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the 
case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved 
in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys in-
volved.'" Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 232 (Utah 1997). 
In the present case, the trial court failed to take into consideration the severe fi-
nancial burdens placed on Husband by the division of the marital estate in this case. In 
addition to the depletion of retirement assets resulting from the sale of the marital resi-
dence, which had negative equity (R. 316 f^ 22), and the imbalance in distribution caused 
by all of the court's "equitable adjustments," the court imposed all of the parties' debt on 
husband, totaling some $65,000 {see ex. D-l). Husband also had the burden of his own 
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litigation expenses. The court's justification, that Wife "needs to preserve the retirement 
assets she has been awarded as she grows older," (R. 326 ^ 68) rings hollow when the 
court considers that the marital portion of the retirement assets was divided equally, and 
Husband had the same need. The court's other justification, that Husband had a greater 
ability than Wife to earn additional income to pay the fees, was a simple conclusion un-
supported by appropriately detailed factual findings. Indeed, the relevant facts, found by 
the court in Findings 63 and 64, were that Husband had no surplus income. The only 
way for Husband to meet the obligation imposed by the court was to withdraw funds 
from retirement and incur income tax and penalties in doing so. 
In essence, the award of attorney's fees to Wife was a back-door method of award-
ing her a disproportionate $7,500 from the marital estate. The facts found by the court 
did not support its conclusions of need or ability to pay, and the award was inequitable 
and erroneous. Certainly, Wife's contention that more should have been awarded cannot 
withstand the rigors of the abuse of discretion standard applicable to review of a trial 
court's award of attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Husband requests that this Court affirm the division of 
the Basic Retirement Plan and the 401(k) Plan; that it reverse the division of the Deferred 
Compensation Plan and direct that the entire amount of that plan is Husband's separate 
property; that it reverse the trial court's treatment of withdrawals from the retirement ac-
counts to the extent set forth in this brief; that it reverse the trial court's "equitable ad-
justments;" that it reverse the inclusion of the entire Lenox collection in the marital es-
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tate; that it reverse the alimony award; and that it reverse the award of attorney's fees to 
Wife. 
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